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Gilbert Ryle and the Ethical Impetus for Know-How
Matt Dougherty
This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of
Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of “knowing-how”. It is ar-
gued that in addition tohismotiveofdiscounting a certain theory
of mind, his interest in the notion also stemmed (and perhaps
stemmed more deeply) from two ethical interests: one concern-
ing his own life as a philosopher and whether the philosopher
has anymeaningful task, and one concerning the ancient issue of
whether virtue is a kind of knowledge. It is argued that Ryle saw
know-howas crucial in both respects and, also, that he continued
to be interested in these ethical issues throughout his career.
Gilbert Ryle and the Ethical Impetus for
Know-How
Matt Dougherty
To elucidate the thoughts of a philosopher we need to
ﬁnd the answer not only to the question “What were his
intellectual worries?” but, before that question and after
that question, the answer to the question “What was his
overriding Worry?” Gilbert Ryle (1971a, ix)
1. Introduction
The paper “Knowing How and Knowing That”, Gilbert Ryle’s
presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in 1945, marked
the start of an ongoing discussion in philosophy on the nature
of knowing how to do things and its relation to knowing truths
and facts. If Ryle was right, his distinction was one which is
“quite familiar to all of us” (Ryle 1945a, 4). But there is little
doubt that he himself was largely responsible for bringing it to
philosophical consciousness.
His primary aim in doing so is commonly understood to have
been anti-Cartesian. In the presidential address, he describes
himself as clarifying the nature of intelligence—or, in his more
linguistic terms, as clarifying “the logical behaviour of the several
concepts of intelligence” (ibid., 1). He lists various such concepts,
but his concept of choice is knowing how.1 He believes that once
1Other such concepts that hementions are shrewdly,wittily,methodically, and
scrupulously. Presumably, he believed that to do a thing in any of these ways
is to do it knowingly and that the basic way in which to do a thing knowingly
is to exercise knowledge how to do it.
we are clear about what knowing how to do things consists in—
for instance, what knowing how to ride a bicycle or knowing
how to care for a garden consists in—we will see that a person’s
intelligence is “as directly exhibited in some of his doings as it is
in some of his thinking” (ibid., 5). Ryle’s most explicit aim, then,
is to erase the temptation to think that intelligence is or amounts
to thinking—the view he calls “Intellectualism”. And though
Descartes is not mentioned here, the proposed view is plausibly
anti-Cartesian. For erasing the temptation to believe that human
intelligence essentially amounts to thinking also plausibly erases
the Cartesian temptation to believe that human being essentially
amounts to thinking.
That we now tend to think of Ryle’s aim in his presidential ad-
dress as speciﬁcally anti-Cartesian, however, may result from the
fact that The Concept of Mind (his most famous work, published
four years later) is explicitly anti-Cartesian, and knowledge-how
again takes centre stage there. In the introduction to the book,
Ryle states his purpose as “exploding” “the Cartesian myth”
of “the ghost in the machine”—a view which, he says, under-
stands humanmind and agency as “para-mechanical” (that is, as
one part paranormal and one part mechanical) (Ryle 1949, 7ﬀ).
Add to this that the chapter entitled “Knowing How and Know-
ing That” is the ﬁrst substantive chapter of the book (following
the chapter entitled “Descartes’ Myth”, and repeating much of
the material of his presidential address), and it becomes quite
reasonable to assume not only that the notion of know-how is
foundational for Ryle’s critique in The Concept of Mind but also
that the impetus for discussing the notion was anti-Cartesian all
along.
Such assumptions are certainly plausible and, to an extent,
correct. Alone, however, they leave us with an impoverished
picture of the genesis (and continuation) of Ryle’s interest in
know-how. The notion clearly does form part of the foundation
of his anti-Cartesian critique in The Concept of Mind, and the
initial motivation for discussing it may, at least in part, have
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been anti-Cartesian. But we have good reason to believe that
much more motivates his concern with it, even regarding The
Concept of Mind.
In “Ryle’s ‘Intellectualist Legend’ inHistoricalContext” (2017),
MichaelKremer hasprovideduswith an additional aspect of this
picture. He has shown that in taking Intellectualism as his en-
emy, Ryleplausibly sawhimself as contributing to adecades-long
debate about the nature of human mind and agency, “spanning
not only philosophy, but also psychology, economics, political
science, and sociology”.2 Put in the most general terms, this de-
bate pitted Reason against Instinct, with individuals who took
Reason’s side being labelled “intellectualists”, and those who
took Instinct’s side being labelled “anti-intellectualists”. While
intellectualists understood human beings as basically rational
and as at their best when acting with deliberation and thought,
the latter understood humans, much like non-human animals, as
basically instinctual and as at their bestwhen acting instinctually.
As Kremer tells the story, the so-called “revolt against reason”
in philosophy was led by the French intuitionist Henri Bergson.3
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Bergson had become a
public intellectual and cult ﬁgure and, in 1928, even received a
Nobel Prize in literature.4 But this was no doubt a controver-
sial choice. In 1915, the sociologist L. T. Hobhouse had said of
Bergson’s philosophy that it was ﬁtting for “a generation which
was rushing headlong on disaster”, since it degraded reason
and placed instinct “upon the throne” (Hobhouse 1915, 51; Kre-
mer 2017, 24). In 1918, the American philosopher Ralph Barton
2Kremer (2017, 17-18); I rely on Kremer for the historical content of this and
the following paragraph.
3With some help from the American pragmatist William James. See, e.g.,
A Pluralistic Universe (1909).
4Technically, Bergson won the 1927 Nobel Prize for literature, but he was
not awarded it until 1928. In 1927, the committee had decided that there were
no suitable candidates. They thus saved the award until the following year and
awarded it then, along with the 1928 prize, which was won by the Norwegian
novelist Sigrid Undset. (Bergson, however, had been nominated numerous
times prior.)
Perry seconded Hobhouse, calling Bergson’s philosophy a form
of “irrationalism”, supported by “themotivation of lawlessness”
(Perry 1918, 296; Kremer 2017, 24). And even into the Second
World War, the assault on Bergson and anti-intellectualism con-
tinued, with then-political scientist Max Lerner going as far as
to say that Bergson and other anti-intellectualists had prepared
the ground for Hitler, albeit unconsciously (Lerner 1943, Kremer
2017, 21). Bergson was thus seen as the arch anti-intellectualist.
Today, the term “anti-intellectualism” is commonly used to
describe Ryle’s position as well, but as Kremer argues, Ryle’s
aim in opposing the Intellectualist legend is not to defend anti-
intellectualism as just described but, rather, to mark a path be-
tween intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.5 In both the presi-
dential address and The Concept of Mind, Ryle argues that human
action can be rational without involving reasoning—being, in a
sense, both rational and instinctual. In particular, Ryle aims to
mark a path between Reason and Instinct by arguing that exer-
cises of knowledge-how involve both. Kremer’s history of the
Intellectualism debate brings this more ﬁrmly to light and thus
adds some historical richness to the story of Ryle’s interest in
know-how.
I believe, however, that neither the anti-Cartesian story nor
Kremer’s history of the Intellectualism debate, even together,
gives us a suitably complete story. Indeed, I think that the most
basic impetus for Ryle’s interest in know-how lay elsewhere. I
will be arguing that his most basic interest in know-how was
(broadly speaking) an ethical one, with both a theoretical and
a practical dimension. In the epigraph to this paper, we see
Ryle state that to understand a philosopher, we need to know
not only their “intellectual worries”—their theoretical aims and
interests—but also their “overriding Worry”—their more basic,
perhaps existential motivations.6 In arguing that Ryle’s interest
5Indeed, one could argue that this was Bergson’s aim as well.
6Iris Murdoch (1970, 72) similarly notes that “[i]t is always a signiﬁcant
question to ask about any philosopher: what is he afraid of?”
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in know-how was an ethical one, I will be arguing that his own
worries consisted in part of an ethical intellectual worry and in
part of an ethical Worry.
First, Ryle was intellectually worried by a question commonly
discussed by the ancient Greeks. He was concerned with the
question of what ethical virtue (that feature which the Greeks
took to constitute or else to be necessary for living a good and
meaningful life) is. Speciﬁcally, he was concerned with whether
ethical virtue is a kind of knowledge. We see him interacting
with this question in the presidential address itself, but also in a
related discussion occurring ﬁve years prior—“Conscience and
Moral Convictions” (1940). In this earlier paper, he is concerned
to argue that genuinemoral knowledge (which he also construes
as virtue) is knowledge-how, or skill.7 We then see the same view
expressed again, albeit in passing, in the presidential address.
As a precursor to his use of the notion of know-how in arguing
against Cartesianism and Intellectualism, this ﬁrst ethical inter-
est is an important one. As we will see, it is an interest which
he continues to engage with in various forms to the end of his
career.8
Second, Ryle regularly entertained a Worry about the status
of philosophy itself. Having begun his philosophical career just
after the fall of “psychologism” and at the start of “analytic”
philosophy, he was worried that the discipline had no real job
to do, that there was no properly philosophical knowledge, and,
hence, that life as a philosopher—a life that he was living—was
a senseless one. As with his intellectual worry, this worry has to
7Ryle uses the terms “ethical” and “moral” interchangeably, such that talk-
ing of “ethical virtue” (if ethical virtue is a kind of knowledge) and talking of
“moral knowledge” are two ways of talking about the same thing. I depart
from this usage in also talking of Ryle’s Worry as an ethical one. The ethical,
as I understand it, is concerned with how to live generally, whereas the moral
is concerned more speciﬁcally with how to live with other people. In discussing
Ryle’s views, however, I follow his usage.
8Kremer (2017) brieﬂy discusses this topic in the ﬁnal few paragraphs of
his paper, but his discussion deserves expansion as well as some clariﬁcation.
Hermann (2013) also engages with Ryle’s later work on virtue and knowledge.
do with the goodness or meaningfulness of a life—it is thus an
ethical worry. But unlike the other, this worry for Ryle, himself a
philosopher, is an eminently practical one—it is a concern with
living a meaningful life. In regard to this worry, too, he saw
know-how as the answer. He came to hold that the philosopher’s
characteristic kind of knowledge is knowledge-how, rather than
knowledge-that, and thus that the practice of philosophy is a
sensible one after all.
In elaborating on these points in this paper, I begin as Ryle rec-
ommends, by discussing hisWorry. I then turn to his intellectual
worry. The resulting picture will, I hope, serve as an important
supplement toKremer’s history of the Intellectualismdebate and
to the anti-Cartesian story of Ryle’s interest in know-how.
2. A Philosophical Crisis
It is widely appreciated that Ryle shared various philosophi-
cal dispositions with Ludwig Wittgenstein. Both are seen, for
instance, as having anti-Cartesian and pseudo-behaviouristic
philosophical views and as preferring linguistic and therapeutic
philosophical methods. But comparisons along these lines tend
to be made between Ryle and the so-called “later Wittgenstein”,
especially of the 1953 Philosophical Investigations. Much less
widely appreciated is the inﬂuence of the “early Wittgenstein”
on Ryle. It wasWittgenstein’s 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
however, that ﬁrst captivated Ryle and that set the tone and task
for his philosophical career. And this is because it was the Trac-
tatus, according to Ryle, that threw philosophy in England in the
ﬁrst half of the 20th century into crisis.9
As Ryle tells this story, philosophers at the turn of the cen-
tury were moving beyond a psychologistic view of philosophy
9Ryle sometimes gives equal weight in this story to the Logical Positivists
(see, e.g., Ryle 1970, 9–10), but seemingly because he saw Wittgenstein’s work
as also momentous for helping resolve the crisis, his focus tends to be on
Wittgenstein.
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(Ryle 1951, 250ﬀ; see also Tanney 2013, 94ﬀ). He reports that
from Locke through Bradley, philosophers had tacitly under-
stood their activity as a psychological one and had debated their
issues as if they were psychological issues—as if the philoso-
pher’s job was to describe how the mind works. But by the late
19th century, psychology had started being practiced in labs and
clinics, and this made philosophy’s armchair psychology sus-
pect. As a result, philosophers were being forced to re-conceive
of what they were doing and to understand their job in other
terms.
Ryle says that, for a time, philosophers took shelter in Pla-
tonic idioms. They thought of themselves as concerned not with
the workings of the mind but with the domain of “abstract” or
“conceptual” entities, entities like possibilities, essences, time-
lessly subsisting universals, numbers, truths, falsities, values,
and meanings. Doing so had the double beneﬁt of enabling
philosophy to keep its status as a science (viz., the science of ab-
stract entities), as well as of enabling it to keep its status as an
autonomous science, independent from (or else foundational to)
other sciences.
In the period at the start of the century, Ryle says that philoso-
phers “tried not to mind the dream-like character of [this] new
asylum” (Ryle 1951, 252). But Bertrand Russell, in his attempts
to groundmathematics in logic, ran into a paradox which would
lead to their disenchantment:
Russell, in his inquiries into the logical principles underlyingmath-
ematics, found that he could not well help constructing statements
which had the logically disturbing property that they were true
only on condition that they were false, and false only on condition
that they were true. (Ryle 1951, 252)10
Ryle comments that Russell found a solution to this paradox but
that it was Wittgenstein who drew the solution’s crisis-inducing
10Ryle presumably refers here only to Russell’s semantic paradoxes, rather
than the logical ones, such as “Russell’s paradox”.
conclusions for logic and philosophy—and, in doing so, set the
task for Ryle’s own generation of philosophers.
Put one way, both Russell and Wittgenstein thought that the
paradox could be resolved by distinguishing, on the one hand,
between truth and falsehood and, on the other, between mean-
ingfulness and meaninglessness. Both agreed that the state-
ments Russell had found (that were true only on condition that
they were false, and false only on condition that they were true)
were in fact neither true nor false butmeaningless—theywere, as
Ryle puts it, “nonsensical simulacra of statements” (ibid.). Rus-
sell, however, thought of nonsense as relative to a language, such
that a statement that was nonsensical in one language needn’t
be nonsensical in all languages.11 Wittgenstein agreed that non-
sense is relative to a language but thought that at least one lan-
guage must non-relatively makes sense; and he thought that
whatever is nonsense in that language is nonsense full stop.
Wittgenstein thus came to hold in the Tractatus that it was the
job of the logician and philosopher to determine not the substan-
tive truth and falsehood statements but, rather, their making or
not making sense. The philosopher, he thought, does not study
abstract entities but, rather, determines what can and cannot be
signiﬁcantly said. The further, crisis-inducing implication was
then just a step away:
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein came to the frustrating conclusion
that . . . [t]o try to tell whatmakes the diﬀerence between signiﬁcant
and nonsensical talk is itself to cross the divide between signiﬁcant
and nonsensical talk. Philosophizing [as well as logic] can, indeed,
open our eyes to [principles of sense and nonsense], but it cannot
issue in signiﬁcant statements of them. Philosophy is not a science;
it cannot yield theories or doctrines. (Ryle 1951, 253)
11We see evidence that this was Russell’s view, at least at the time of the
Tractatus, in the introduction that hewrote for that book. Potter (2002)discusses
these issues, and the diﬀerences between Wittgenstein and Russell on them,
in more detail. See also Landini (2004) for a detailed look at Russell’s varying
approaches to the paradoxes.
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According to the early Wittgenstein, the conception of philoso-
phy which he had reached had the implication that to do philos-
ophy is to cross the bounds of sense, thus making philosophical
practice itself a kind of nonsense. As he saw it, this meant that
all of philosophy’s problems and statements are mere pseudo-
problems and pseudo-statements, formed of the non-sensical
and, hence, strictly speaking, of the unsayable. He could thus
think of himself as having “solved” all of its problems.12
As Ryle and others saw it, however, the Tractatus rather set
them an urgent, existential task:
We were [then] facing what was in eﬀect the . . . challenge of Witt-
genstein’s Tractatus . . . We philosophers were in for a near-lifetime
of enquiry into our own title to be enquirers. Had we any answer-
able questions, including this one? (Ryle 1970, 10)
As Ryle expresses this in the introduction to his Collected Papers,
the problemwas that philosophy had considered itself a science,
concerned with discovering truths, theories, and doctrines. But
the Tractatus had raised some troubling questions:
What sort of an enquiry is philosophy as distinct from Natural
Science,Mental Science,Mathematics, Theology andFormal Logic?
What, if any, is its proprietary subject-matter? What, if any, is its
peculiar method? (Ryle 1971a, ix)
These questions occupied Ryle from the point of the Tractatus on-
ward, not merely as theoretical questions but as practical ones,
concerning how he and other philosophers were to understand
themselves, as well as whether they could understand them-
selves as doing anything meaningful at all.
By 1937, Ryle had come upon an answer to these questions
that suitably satisﬁed him, though he seems to have continued
to work out its details for the remainder of his career. It was an
answer that would lead him, within a few years, to the notion
of know-how. In his “Taking Sides in Philosophy” (1937), Ryle
12See Wittgenstein’s Preface to the work.
gives both a negative and a positive construal of philosophy. On
the negative side, he agrees with the view of the Tractatus that
philosophy isnot in thebusiness of yielding theories ordoctrines.
Hereheputs this as thepoint that philosophy is not about “taking
sides”, not about settling upon Idealism or Realism, Rationalism
or Empiricism, Monism or Pluralism. Indeed, he argues that
philosophy has no place for “isms” at all, save for in student
examinations and as short-cuts in philosophical discussion. But
on the positive side, Ryle nonetheless understands philosophy
as a form of “discovery”:
The real root of my objection [to taking sides in philosophy] is, I
think, the view that I take of the nature of philosophical inquiry. I
am not going to expound it in full, but a part of the view is that it is
a species of discovery. And it seems absurd for discoverers to split
into Whigs and Tories. (Ryle 1937, 320)
It seems absurd for discoverers to split intoWhigs and Tories, the
thought seems to be, because doing so requires having settled
opinions or theories, and to settle upon a theory is, to that extent,
to have ceased actively being a discoverer. Factions only make
sense when one is no longer in the process of discovering; so
factions in philosophy indicate that, properly speaking, it is not
philosophy which is being done.
Ryle’s view here may ultimately be untenable. But what mat-
ters for our current purposes are the details of his positive con-
ception of philosophy as a form of discovery. Essential to this
conception are not the theories in which philosophy results but,
rather, its method. Philosophy, Ryle says, is its method, and its
method is “dialectic” or “argument”:
Philosophers do not make known matters of fact which were un-
known before. The sense in which they throw light is that they
make clear what was unclear before, or make obvious things which
were previously in amuddle. And the dawning of this desiderated
obviousness occurs in the ﬁnding of a logically rigorous philosophi-
cal argument. Something that was obscure becomes obvious to me
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in the act of seeing the force of a particular philosophical argu-
ment. Nor can I make a short cut to that clariﬁcation by perusing
the conclusions, but skipping the reasoning of the argument.
(Ryle 1937, 329–30)13
Once again, the ﬁngerprints of theTractatus are clear. Ryle agrees
with Wittgenstein that philosophy is not in the business of pro-
pounding theories or doctrines, and he agrees that it is in the
business of clarifying (or “throwing light on”) what was un-
clear before. But whereas the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus thus
concludes that philosophy is nonsensical, Ryle disagrees. For
Ryle, philosophers needn’t throw away any ladder, in Wittgen-
stein’s phrase.14 They rather have as their task to engage ongo-
ingly in a method of dialectic or argument. As Ryle expresses
later, marking his reason for departing from the Tractatus on this
point, “Wittgenstein [in theTractatus] had himself said very eﬀec-
13One might reasonably wonder here whether Ryle is not himself taking
philosophical sides (or, rather,meta-philosophical sides). He says, for instance,
in concluding the paper, that one of the greatest discoveries that a philosopher
can make is a discovery of a new method (Ryle 1937, 332). This might seem to
imply that dialectic is not the only method of philosophy. It would be more
charitable, however, to understand him as thinking that there are diﬀerent
methods of argument and dialectic, thus sub-methods of philosophy. This
would especially seem the properly charitable view to take in light of his
close acquaintance with phenomenology. (See, e.g., his review of Heidegger’s
Sein und Zeit (1928), his “Phenomenology” (1932), his review of Farber’s The
Foundations of Phenomenology (1946) and his later “Phenomenology Versus ‘The
Concept of Mind’” (1962).) He clearly thought of phenomenology as a form
of philosophy, so we should assume that he would have been willing to think
of phenomenology as consisting of a form of argument or dialectic. Though
this would still, in a sense, be taking sides.
14The most famous lines of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are the ﬁrst and the
penultimate. The line referred tohere is thepenultimate, inwhichWittgenstein
expresses that philosophical statements clarify but are themselves nonsense:
Mypropositions are elucidatory in thisway: hewhounderstandsmeﬁnally
recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on
them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has
climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.
(Wittgenstein 1921, 6.54)
tive things, and talking eﬀectively is not talking nonsensically”
(1951, 253).15 So, though Ryle takes it as true that philosophy
does not properly yield theories, he still holds that “it can be
skilful or unskilful, successful or unsuccessful” (Ryle 1951, 253).
It is not nonsense but rather consists of method, done well or
done poorly.16 For Ryle, this was the answer to the philosophical
crisis. But he continues to be concerned with it well after 1937.
Hiswork on knowing-how constitutes a signiﬁcant and crucial
part of this continued concern. If philosophy really is to be a
method and not a body of doctrines or truths, there must really
be a distinction betweenmethod and truth. And if the philosopher
is to be characterised as a discoverer and knower of method,
rather than a discoverer and knower of truths, there must really
be a distinction between knowing amethod andknowing a truth.
And these are precisely the terms in which he introduces us to
the distinction between “knowing-how” and “knowing-that” in
the presidential address of 1945, with the aim of showing that
they are distinct and mutually irreducible concepts:
Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction which is quite
familiar to all of us between knowing that something is the case
and knowing how to do things. In their theories of knowledge
they concentrate on the discovery of truths or facts, and they either
ignore the discovery of ways and methods of doing things or else
they try to reduce it to the discovery of facts. (Ryle 1945a, 3)
And later in the same work:
The advance of knowledge does not consist only in the accumu-
lation of discovered truths, but also and chieﬂy in the cumulative
mastery of methods. (ibid., 15)
15Ryle, then, is an early “irresolute” reader of the Tractatus, as it has come
to be called, though he understands Wittgenstein himself as having intended
a resolute reading. (See, e.g., Conant and Bronzo (2016) on these diﬀerent
readings of the Tractatus.)
16It is worth noting (as Tanney 2013, n 3, does) that Ryle understands Witt-
genstein as having come around to this view himself and as having exhibited
it masterfully in the Philosophical Investigations. See, e.g., Ryle (1951, 255).
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Though these claims are not explicitlymeta-philosophical, when
read against the backdrop of his meta-philosophical position of
1937, it becomes plausible that he saw this non-reducibility as
crucial for philosophy. It suggests that he sawhis task in securing
the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that as
in part securing the status of philosophy itself.17
This point is further supported by a paper that Ryle seems
to have been composing alongside the presidential address—
both, apparently, rather hastily.18 A week prior to delivering
“Knowing How and Knowing That” to the Aristotelian Soci-
ety, Ryle also gave his inaugural lecture as Waynﬂete Professor
at Oxford, “Philosophical Arguments” (1945b). This lecture is
through-and-through meta-philosophical, and it is so in at least
two ways relevant to the presidential address. First, Ryle’s ex-
plicit aim in the inaugural lecture is to exhibit the logical struc-
ture of a key method of philosophy—viz., reductio ad absurdum
arguments.19 This is interesting in relation to the presidential
address at least because reductio ad absurdum is the form of ar-
gument on which Ryle relies heavily there. His primary way of
arguing that knowledge-how is not reducible to knowledge-that
is to show that assuming otherwise results in vicious regresses—
akindof absurdity. It is thus plausible that he saw the twopapers
as closely connected.
And, second, Ryle also makes very clear in his inaugural lec-
ture that the reason he is concerned to exhibit the logical struc-
17In the presidential address, Ryle does hold that knowledge-how is basic to
non-philosophical disciplines aswell—indeed, he could be read as arguing that
knowledge-how is the basic form of knowledge simpliciter. What is distinctive
about philosophy, for Ryle, at least in relation to some other disciplines, is that
it does not also have knowledge-that as an aim. So while the various sciences,
for instance, may also properly result in the propounding of facts, philosophy
does not.
18Ryle had been released from his military duties just a month or so prior
(Kremer 2017, 36).
19Ryle had made the idea of absurdity central in his methodology in his
earlier “Categories” (1938). “Philosophical Arguments” (1945b) can be seen
as a further ﬂeshing out of that idea.
ture of reductio ad absurdum arguments is that he is concerned,
once again, with the status of philosophy itself. In introducing
his topic in “Philosophical Arguments”, he expresses this worry
about the status of philosophy much as we have seen it above:
Philosophers have in recent years given much consideration to the
nature, objectives and methods of their own inquiry. This inter-
est has been due partly to a certain professional hypochondria,
since the conspicuous progress made by other studies has induced
in philosophers some nervousness about the scale of their own
successes. Partly, also . . . [t]he exposition of the logical credentials
of diﬀerent sorts of scientiﬁc conclusions has posed in a bright if
painful light the corresponding questions about the foundations of
philosophical doctrines. (Ryle 1945b, 196)
It is directly following this passage that Ryle states his aim of ex-
hibiting the logical structure of reductio ad absurdum arguments,
making clear that his underlying aim in doing so is to legiti-
mate philosophy. And he again emphasizes here that philoso-
phy is not in the business of yielding doctrines or truths but of
method—he compares the practice of philosophy to the practice
of an engineer who discovers the strength of various materials.
The philosopher, he says, similarly tests the strength of philo-
sophical propositions and arguments. At the time of writing
and delivering “Knowing How and Knowing That”, then, Ryle
is clearly still concerned with securing the foundations of phi-
losophy. In particular, he is concerned to secure its methods;
so it would be surprising if he did not see the similar (though
more basic) importance of showing that knowing such methods
is irreducible to knowing truths.
Finally, it is worth noting that in hindsight, Ryle paints a sim-
ilarly meta-philosophical picture of The Concept of Mind itself.
In his “Autobiography”, Ryle reports that having taken up the
Waynﬂete Professorship in 1945, he thought that he ought to
apply, and be seen to be applying to some large-scale philosoph-
ical crux the answer to the question that had preoccupied us in
the 1920s, and especially in the 1930s, the question namely “What
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constitutes a philosophical problem; and what is the way to solve
it?” (Ryle 1970, 12)
As we have seen, his answer to the latter question is “argument
and dialectic” and, primarily, “reductio ad absurdum arguments”.
As he saw it, “what was needed now was an example of the
method really working, in breadth and depth and where it was
really needed” (ibid.).20 In fact, Ryle initially took as his “large-
scale philosophical crux” the problem of the freedom of the will;
but he later settled upon the concept of mind. He thus describes
The Concept of Mind as a “philosophical book” with a “meta-
philosophical purpose” (ibid.). In light of this, it would seem that
his anti-Cartesianism is better seen as the vehicle of his project in
that book than its fundamental end. The fundamental end was
showing that philosophy had a job to do and could do it. This
was Ryle’s Worry—a practical ethical impetus for his interest in
know-how.
3. Know-How and Virtue
We now turn to the more theoretical ethical impetus for Ryle’s
interest inknow-how—what I have above calledhis ethical “intel-
lectual worry”. In this respect, the inﬂuence of the ancient Greek
philosophers onRyle, like the inﬂuence of the earlyWittgenstein,
is not widely appreciated. On reading the presidential address
of 1945, one is thus likely to take the numerous references to
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle as mere asides. He casually begins
the paper by mentioning that the Intellectualist legend perhaps
derives from Plato’s account of the tripartite soul; later men-
tions that Aristotle’s solution to Socrates’ puzzle of akrasia fails
because it assumes a form of Intellectualism; claims, in passing,
that the notion of know-how also resolves Socrates’ puzzle about
why human excellence cannot be imparted; and, ﬁnally, states
20Ryle’s famous “categorymistake” arguments (used liberally in The Concept
of Mind) are also forms of reductio ad absurdum.
that Aristotle’s “–εθισµo´ς” (ethismos) is better understood in terms
of “know-how” than in terms of the usual translation, “habitu-
ation”. In fact, each but the third of these points is made in an
actual parenthetical aside. But it is little accident that Ryle would
have been engagingwith the Greeks here, and also little accident
that he would have been thinking of know-how as having direct
ties to virtue.
A ﬁrst reason for this is that Ryle was steeped in ancient Greek
philosophy. Not only did he study Greats (or “Classics”) as an
undergraduate at Oxford (Ryle 1970, 1–3) and, subsequently,
teach Greek philosophy “in some detail” to Oxford undergradu-
ates (ibid., 11); he also published numerous exegetical (and often
quite technical) reviews, articles, and a book on the topic.21 Re-
actions to Ryle’s work in ancient philosophy are mixed, but he
clearly studied the Greeks closely.22
21Amongst his work in ancient philosophy are “Plato’s Parmenides” (1939a),
“Review of F.M. Cornford Plato and Parmenides” (1939b), “Letters and Sylla-
bles in Plato” (1960), “The ‘Timaeus Locrus’” (1965a), “The Academy and
Dialectic” (1965b), “Dialectic in the Academy” (1965c), Plato’s Progress (1966a),
and “Plato” (1967). This is not to mention the numerous other articles in
which Ryle notes ancient Greek or Roman philosophers in passing, relating
them to his immediate topic. His engagement with the history of philosophy
seemed to have been spurred, at least in part, by an aversion to the kind of
philosopher-worship that he sometimes witnessed in Cambridge at the height
of Wittgenstein’s popularity. He notes that when visiting the Moral Sciences
Club, the “veneration for Wittgenstein was so incontinent that mentions, for
example my mentions, of other philosophers were greeted with jeers . . . This
contempt for thoughts other than Wittgenstein’s seemed to me pedagogically
disastrous for the students and unhealthy for Wittgenstein himself. It made
me resolve, not indeed to be a philosophical polyglot, but to avoid being a
monoglot; and most of all to avoid being one monoglot’s echo, even though he
was a genius and a friend” (Ryle 1970, 11).
22Charles Kahn’s (1968) review of Ryle’s Plato’s Progress is informative here.
Kahn reports that Ryle had already made important contributions to Plato
scholarship but that Plato’s Progress is more interesting forwhat it tells us about
Ryle’s own view of philosophy than what it tells us about the life and philos-
ophy of Plato. In Plato’s Progress we once again see Ryle emphasizing a view
like the one expressed in his “Taking Sides in Philosophy”—“[P]hilosophy is
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That he did would help to explain why Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle came readily to mind when he was writing “Knowing
How and Knowing That”. The presidential address was pre-
sented just a month or so after Ryle had been demobilized from
four years serving in military intelligence—likely meaning that
the paper (alongwith his inaugural lecture as theWaynﬂete Pro-
fessor) would have been written in a rather short period of time
(see, again, Kremer 2017, 36). If this is so, it would make sense
for Ryle to have leant on material that he knew well.
That Ryle took a general interest in ancient Greek philosophy,
however, does not explain why speciﬁcally ethical topics came to
mind. Why did they? A large part of the answer is that prior
to his military service, Ryle had already written a paper making
use of a distinction much like that between knowing-how and
knowing-that, and that paper had an explicitly ethical aim. In
1940, he had published “Conscience and Moral Convictions”,
which made central use of a distinction between “operative
knowledge” and “academic knowledge”. One of itsmain conclu-
sions had been that genuinemoral knowledge is operative rather
than academic; and, as we will see, he often talks of operative
knowledge as “knowledge how”. Ethical topics came to mind
in writing “Knowing How and Knowing That”, then, because
Ryle had already been writing and thinking of the distinction in
ethical terms. And by the time of the presidential address, he
had begun to explore it explicitly in terms of a favourite question
of the ancients: namely, “Is virtue a kind of knowledge?” He
clearly thought that the notion of know-how helped to answer
this question. As we will see, the asides of the presidential ad-
dress form an argument for the same answer given in the earlier
paper—an answer which Socrates had been drawn to but which
Aristotle had denied: that virtue is a kind of know-how, or skill.
not adherence to a tenet or membership of a church or party. It is exploration”
(Ryle 1966a, 9). Also interesting to note is that Ryle conjectures that Plato him-
self experienced a philosophical crisis around the time that Aristotle would
have been a student, banning dialectic from the Academy as a result.
At some point after the presidential address, Ryle himself gives
up on this answer, but in the address itself he clearly sets out
to resolve the ancients’ question aﬃrmatively, by seeing virtue
as a kind of skill. His interest in know-how thus has this more
intellectual ethical impetus as well. In the following sections, I
look ﬁrst to Ryle’s early paper concerning moral know-how, be-
fore turning to “Knowing How and Knowing That”, and then to
subsequent work on virtue and knowledge.
3.1. “Conscience and Moral Convictions” (1940)
In “Conscience andMoral Convictions” (1940), Ryle is primarily
interested in what he thinks of as a puzzling fact: that while one
can have moral convictions about the behaviour of others, one
cannot similarly have pangs of conscience on others’ behalves.
One’s conscience says only, “I ought not to have done that” (for
instance), not, “They ought not to have done that”. Convictions,
on the other hand, can concern either. Ryle had always assumed
that a pang of consciencewas simply an expression of knowledge
or conviction that some action-type or particular action is right
or wrong, making pangs of conscience coextensive with felt con-
victions.23 But he now wishes to understand the puzzling fact
that conscience and moral conviction can come apart.
He does so bymaking and putting to use a distinction between
“operative” and “academic” knowledge, deﬁning each by the
public test for its possession. He oﬀers ﬁve such tests—two for
the possession of academic knowledge, two for the possession of
operative knowledge, and one for the possession of a state which
he says is “between” the other two (Ryle 1940, 33). If an agent
academically knows amoral principle, Ryle says, theywill (1) utter
the principle regularly, relevantly, andwithout hesitation and (2)
similarly utter other things which presuppose the principle. An
agent with such knowledge, he says, has a principle as part of
23Ryle uses “knowledge” and “conviction” interchangeably, so I will do the
same here.
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their “intellectual furniture”. If, on the other hand, the agent is
in a state between academic and operative knowledge, they will
also (3) be ready or eager to persuade others of the principle and
to dissuade them of acting inconsistently with it. An agent in
this state, Ryle says, possesses “respect” or “admiration” for the
principle.24 And, ﬁnally, if an agent operatively knows a moral
principle, they will (4) behave in accordance with the principle
regularly, relevantly, andwithout hesitation and (5) similarly feel
guilty, resolve to reform, etc., when having failed to do so. In this
case, Ryle says, the agent has the principle as part of their “real
nature”.25
Academic knowledge and operative knowledge, as Ryle de-
scribes them, are diﬀerent ways of possessing rules or princi-
ples.26 Academic knowledge is possessing a rule less than one
ought to, whereas operative knowledge is possessing it prop-
erly. Operative knowledge, that is, is proper knowledge of a rule.
It is knowledge such that one is disposed to act in accordance
with the rule. He thus understands proper moral knowledge as
operative knowledge, though he intends the same to be true of
knowledge of rules of conduct generally:
To know properly the rules of grammar is to be able to talk correctly,
to correct mistakes and to wince at those of others. A man’s party
manners showwhether he “knows” the rules of etiquette; his ability
to cite “Etiquette for Gentlemen” does not. (Ryle 1940, 187)
24Ryle does not specify whether this state includes academic knowledge.
25It is unclear as well whether he intends operative knowledge to include
academic knowledge. Sometimes it seems so; other times it seems not.
26“I suggest that the solution of the puzzle, which, I think, is a genuine one
about the syntax of ‘conscience’ and of ‘moral conviction’, is in this direction.
What is it to have a moral conviction? Or, what is it to have principles?” (Ryle
1940, 32). Notice that this suggests a diﬀerence between the distinction here
and the distinction of “Knowing How and Knowing That”. In the later paper,
Ryle distinguishes between the kinds of knowledge in terms not only of how
what is known is known (viz., in terms of ability to say how to perform a given
action vs. ability to perform the action) but also in terms of what is known (true
propositions or facts vs. ways, methods, or rules).
And here, he also speaks in terms of “know-how” and “skill”:
In a certain sense, I, having read the text-books andbeen a spectator,
know how to swim; that is, I know what actions people must take
to progress in a desired direction in the water, with nostrils clear of
the water. But no one would say that I really know how to swim
or that I have swimming-skill, unless when I do it myself I usually
succeed. (ibid., 188)27
Just as the proper manifestation of know-how or skill is skil-
ful performance, Ryle says, so the proper manifestation of con-
science is good conduct. Conscience involves having convictions
in an operativeway, such that one is disposed to act in accordance
with the principle about which one is convicted (and is reluctant
to act badly, and feels remorse when one does so, etc.). And
just as it would be absurd to say that one has “skill or expert-
ness in the swimming of others” (ibid.), so it would be absurd
to say that one has pangs of conscience about the behaviour of
others. One may have pangs of conscience about how to respond
to the behaviour of others, but not about their behaviour itself.
Ryle thus concludes that whereas conviction may express either
operative or academic knowledge, conscience expresses only op-
erative knowledge. This is why conscience says only, “I ought
not to have done that”, and not, “They ought not to have done
that”.
The interestingpoint for ourpurposes is that in this 1940paper,
Ryle claims that to know amoral rule properly or really is to know
it operatively, rather than academically. For, again, he claims that
knowing operatively is knowing-how.28 And he is also happy to
talk of operatively knowing a moral rule as (for instance) being
honest—hence, in terms of virtue. These two points make for a
smooth transition from talking primarily in terms of operative
27Ryle is less concessive in “Knowing How and Knowing That”. He does
not allow, for instance, that having read a swimming textbook is suﬃcient for
knowing how to swim in any sense.
28He says, for instance, “To know operatively the rules [of calculation] is to
know how to calculate” (Ryle 1940, 37).
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and moral knowledge in “Conscience and Moral Convictions”
to talking in terms of knowledge-how and virtue in “Knowing
How and Knowing That”.29
3.2. “Knowing How and Knowing That” (1945)
On the face of it (and indeed for the most part), Ryle’s presi-
dential address of 1945 concerns a very diﬀerent issue to that
of “Conscience andMoral Convictions”. It concerns intelligence
generally, by discussing intelligent behaviour generally. As noted
above, he begins the address by disparaging Plato’s tripartite ac-
count of the soul and its concomitant account of human action,
claiming that it is a possible source of “the Intellectualist leg-
end” which he himself aims to disprove (Ryle 1945a, 1).30 With
the earlier paper as background, however, the ethical undertones
of this and the other asides concerning the ancients becomemore
prominent. Here, I will discuss each of the asides relevant to his
thinking here of virtue as a kind of knowledge-how.
As Ryle explains it, the Intellectualist legend for which Plato
is perhaps responsible is to be understood as positing at least
two faculties in explaining human action. The ﬁrst is Intelli-
gence, whose function is to “consider propositions”, or think.
Intelligence on its own, however, as the legend has it, cannot
eﬀect action. It is thus thought to require, as Ryle calls it, “a
go-between faculty”—a faculty that is incapable itself of consid-
ering propositions but that is capable of eﬀecting action in ac-
29Ryle makes at least two further points in “Conscience and Moral Convic-
tions” that foreshadow “Knowing How and Knowing That”. The ﬁrst is that
knowledge how to behave does not cause a person to behave in a certain way
but, rather, is a disposition to behave, feel, and even think in certain ways
(1940, 34 & 38). And the second is that such a view denies “the hallowed
distinction between cognition, emotion, and volition” (1940, 38). The latter
point, especially, will remain important in Ryle’s post-1945 work on virtue and
knowledge.
30Despite the hedging “perhaps”, we can nonetheless safely call Ryle’s at-
titude toward Plato’s account one of “disparagement”. It is a career-long ob-
jective of Ryle’s to oppose tripartition and even partition. John Ackrill’s “In
Defense of Platonic Division” (1970) has Ryle’s attempts as their subject.
cordance with propositions. This go-between faculty, Ryle says,
is often understood as “the Will” or “Volition”.31 According to
the Intellectualist legend, Intelligence thus commands Volition
to eﬀect a given action and, so long as the agent is not subject
to overly strong Appetite, Volition does so. The result is intelli-
gent human action, rather than, for instance, overly appetitive or
honour-seeking action.32
As already noted, Ryle’s main strategy in arguing against this
account is to show that it results in vicious regresses. His general
explanation ofwhy it does so is as follows. The Intellectualist leg-
end assumes that Volition is incapable of considering regulative
propositions. But unless it is capable of considering regulative
propositions, Volition could never eﬀect actions in accordance
with regulative propositions. That is, unless Volition is able to
understand the propositions commanded by Intelligence (and,
hence, itself think) it will be incapable of applying those propo-
sitions. To eﬀect action, then, Ryle says, Volition must itself have
a faculty of Intelligence (call it “Intelligence*”). But given that
a faculty of Intelligence, on its own, is supposed to be unable
to eﬀect action, Volition will also require its own faculty of Vo-
lition (call it “Volition*”); and then because Volition* will need
to understand the regulative propositions commanded it by In-
telligence*, it will in turn require its own faculty of Intelligence
(call it “Intelligence**”)—and so on. The result is that inﬁnitely
many tasks of thinking will need to be completed before intelli-
gent action can occur. And this, Ryle suggests, implies that the
Intellectualist legend is an absurd one.33
31He also notes that “Feeling” is sometimes made to play this role. For
simplicity, I refer just to Volition here.
32These three (including Appetite) are akin to the Reasoning, Spirited, and
Appetitive parts of the soul in Plato’s tripartite account in the Republic. Ryle
seems to have disliked theRepublic from early on. He reports in his “Autobiog-
raphy” that the many “Plato-venerating philosophy tutors” at Oxford “treated
the Republic like the Bible, and to [Ryle] most of it seemed, philosophically, no
better” (Ryle 1970, 2).
33The regress I have explicated here is the second of two kinds of regress on
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Themost general lesson that he draws from this regress is that
the Intellectualist legend cannot be right, at least in detail. But
the more speciﬁc lesson, and the lesson that he puts to use in
the remainder of the paper, is that intelligence is required not
only for considering propositions but for applying them. Ryle
himself introduces this principle into the Intellectualist legend,
to explain how Volition might be able to apply the propositions
given it by Intelligence. But the subsequent regress is meant to
show that the pointmust be understood in a particularway: viz.,
asmeaning that applying a proposition cannot be just another in-
stance of thinking (Ryle 1945a, 6). This is why, as we saw above,
Ryle concludes that a person’s intelligence must be as directly
exhibitable in some of his doings as it is in some of his thinking.
For it is by assuming that intelligence is only directly manifested
in thinking that the Intellectualist legend ends in vicious regress.
It assumes that Intelligence can only think and not also perform
other tasks, so even givingVolition such a faculty to carry out the
thoughts of Intelligence does not help to explain how it could
apply those thoughts. Somewhere along the way, intelligence
must be directly exhibitable not only in acts of thinking but in
doings that are not acts of thinking. The Intellectualist legend
had only seemed tenable, Ryle thinks, because that point had not
beenproperly recognized. Andhe thinks that properly recogniz-
ing it requires recognizing the distinctness of knowledge-how,
which is exercised not just in thinking but directly in other kinds
of action as well.
How does the point that applying propositions takes intelli-
gence bear on the seeminglydisparate question ofwhether virtue
is a kind of knowledge? We see the answer only gradually. A
which Ryle relies in the presidential address. The ﬁrst, though similar, relies
not on the notion of a go-between faculty but on the simpler point that if an
act can only be intelligent by reference to a further (earlier) act of considering
propositions, no intelligent act could ever be performed. This is the form of
argument that has received the most attention in recent discussions of know-
how.
few pages later, in the second aside that concerns us, Ryle claims
that the Intellectualist legend explains why Aristotle’s treatment
of akrasia fails. Having just said that applying truths requires
intelligence and that knowing how to apply a truth cannot be a
matter merely of knowing some further truth(s), he makes the
following aside:
This is the point where Aristotle’s attempted solution to Socrates’
puzzle broke down. “How can the back-slider know moral and
prudential maxims and still fail to behave properly?” This is only
a special case of the general problem. “How can a man be as well-
informed as you please and still be a fool?” “Why is a fool not
necessarily an ignoramus?” (Ryle 1945a, 6)
Ryle does not tell us what he takes Aristotle’s attempted solution
to Socrates’ puzzle to be, but we know what it was: the akratic
agent, Aristotle says, knows but doesn’t know (Nicomachean Ethics
1147b1–18). I state this ambiguously because it is a matter of
debate preciselywhatAristotle intends. Hemight intend that the
akratic agent “knows the relevant maxim or proposition but not
really” (i.e., knows it partially but not fully), or he might intend
that the akratic agent “knows one proposition but not another”.34
For Ryle to think that Aristotle’s solution fails, however, and fails
34And, indeed, the Aristotle passage is ambiguous:
The explanation of how ignorance is dispelled and the incontinent [i.e.,
akratic] recovers his knowledge is the same as in the case of the person who
is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to this way of being aﬀected. We
must refer here to the natural scientists.
Since the last premise is both a belief about what is perceived, and controls
actions, it must be this that he does not have when he is being aﬀected,
or this that he has in such a way that the having of it amounts not to
knowing it, as we saw, but saying the words as the drunk speaks the words
of Empedocles.
And because the last term does not seem to be universal, or related to
knowledge in the same way as the universal term, the result Socrates was
seeking seems to follow. The knowledge present when someone comes
to be aﬀected by incontinence, and that is “dragged about” because he is
aﬀected, is not what is thought to be real knowledge, but only perceptual
knowledge.
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in a way predicted by the Intellectualist legend, he must think
that the correct interpretation is the latter. He must think that
Aristotle’s view is that the akratic agent considers the relevant
proposition but lacks knowledge of another proposition that, if
it were known, would enable the agent to act in accordance
with the ﬁrst. Aristotle, too, then, as Ryle understands him here,
succumbs to the Intellectualist legend.
Again, Ryle’s alternative to the legend, as well as his own so-
lution to the puzzle of akrasia, turns on his notion of knowledge-
how. On Ryle’s account, whereas knowledge-that involves the
abilitymerely to think or consider true propositions, knowledge-
how involves an ability to intelligently act in accordance with
them. Whereas exercising knowledge-that means merely “ac-
knowledging principles in thought”, exercising knowledge-how
means “intelligently applying them in practice” (Ryle 1945a,
8). And knowledge-how, according to Ryle, is the more basic.
“Rules, like birds”, he says, “must live before they can be stuﬀed”
(ibid., 11).
Ryle’s distinction has faced various challenges since he ﬁrst
introduced it, but important for our current purposes is just
how he puts the distinction to use in answering the question of
whether virtue is a kindof knowledge. Virtue, he says in the third
aside relevant to us, is a kind of knowledge-how. And this, he
thinks, helps to solve not only Socrates’ puzzle about akrasia but
also a further Socratic puzzle about why virtue cannot be taught
by lecture alone. The agent in possession of knowledge-how,
Ryle says, possesses a dispositional excellence, an excellence of
character as concerns the action or activity they know how to
perform, and this excellence is not something that can be taught
by imparting propositions alone but, rather, requires training or
discipline:
Socrateswas puzzledwhy the knowledgewhich constitutes human
excellence cannot be imparted. We can now reply. Learning-how
diﬀers from learning-that. We can be instructed in truths, we can
only be disciplined in methods. (Ryle 1945a, 15)
Virtue, that is, is a kind of knowledge-how rather than know-
ledge-that; and knowledge-how, Ryle suggests, cannot be “im-
parted”. If correct, this also solves Socrates’ puzzle about akrasia.
The akratic agent possesses propositional knowledge of the rel-
evant kind but not knowledge how to behave. As a result, they
are not disposed to act in an excellent way.
Ryle makes a similar point in the fourth and ﬁnal aside rele-
vant to our discussion. Shortly after making the previous point,
he suggests that though Aristotle’s “–εθισµo´ς” (ethismos) is stan-
dardly translated as “habituation”, it is better understood as
meaning “having becomedisciplined” (Ryle 1945a, 15). For Ryle,
whereas habituation results in a kind of mindless behaviour,
discipline results in knowledge-how—an intelligent ability not
only to act correctly but (similar to the “operative knowledge”
of “Conscience and Moral Convictions”) also to detect and cor-
rect mistakes, and to improve. At least in this respect, then, Ryle
interprets Aristotle’s account of ethical virtue as correct, as ac-
knowledging that the virtuous agent has “learned how” to act
correctly. Hemerely insists that this should be understood as ac-
quiring knowledge-how, rather than knowledge-that—since, as
he understands it at this point, virtue is a form of knowledge-how.
3.3. Subsequent work on virtue and knowledge
It is commonly held that in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
had argued fairly convincingly that virtue is not a skill (τε´χνη/
techne¯). It is unclear whether in arguing that virtue is a skill in
“Knowing How and Knowing That”, Ryle recognizes himself as
disagreeing with Aristotle on that point.35 Whatever the case
35Ryle does not make explicit reference to techne¯ in “Knowing How and
Knowing That” (1945a). In his “Letters and Syllables in Plato” (1960), he
translates “τε´χνη” as “science”. And in “The Academy and Dialectic” (1965b),
he translates it as “art”. In his “Can Virtue be Taught?” (1972), though he does
not mention techne¯ by name, he does refer to Aristotle’s discussions of “skill
and virtue” generally, and this “skill” is clearly what Aristotle would have
designated by “τε´χνη”.
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may be, he later comes to abandon the view, for reasons that are,
if not exactly Aristotelian, certainly related to Aristotle’s own.
Kremer (2017) comments brieﬂy on this shift. Noting some
of the connections Ryle makes between know-how and virtue,
he agrees that at the time of the presidential address and even
earlier, Ryle holds that virtue is a skill. He says, however, that as
early as The Concept of Mind, Ryle has begun to be suspicious of
the idea—adding that, by the end of his career, Ryle has come
to think that virtue is not any kind of knowledge (Kremer 2017,
36). The trajectory of Ryle’s thought, however, is more complex
than this suggests. For, ﬁrst, even after The Concept of Mind, Ryle
returns for a time to the view that virtue is a kind of knowledge.
And even in his ﬁnal paper on the topic, though he concludes
by saying that virtue is not a kind of knowledge, there is some
tension in his view. Here, I brieﬂy discuss three post-1945 works
in connection with these points: The Concept of Mind (1949), “On
Forgetting the Diﬀerence Between Right andWrong” (1958), and
“Can Virtue be Taught?” (1972).36
In The Concept of Mind, Ryle does not say that virtue is not a
kind of knowledge. But we do see him hesitating in speaking of
moral know-how, and we do see him implying that such know-
how would have to be dissimilar to other kinds. As we will see
momentarily, both points are evident in the passage Kremer cites
in support of his claim that as early as The Concept of Mind, Ryle
has become suspicious of the idea that virtue is a skill. In the
passage, similar to what we have seen elsewhere, Ryle is talking
of moral knowledge right alongside other kinds of knowledge-
how. He talks of it here, for instance, alongside knowing Latin.
But moral knowledge, he seems to imply, is of a slightly diﬀerent
sort. He says plainly that knowledge of Latin amounts to know-
ing how to compose and construe Latin sentences, but he says
that “moral knowledge, if the strained phrase is to be used at all,
is knowing how to behave” (Ryle 1949, 316). He thus hesitates in
36A fourth relevant piece would be “Jane Austen and theMoralists” (1966b).
using the phrase “moral knowledge” at all. This implies that the
subsequent, “. . . is knowing how to behave”, should be taken
with a grain of salt. He seems to be having misgivings about the
idea that virtue is a kind of knowledge, thus also about the idea
that it is a kind of knowledge-how.
In the remainder of the quoted passage, we see a ﬁrst sign
that his reasons for having these misgivings might be similar to
Aristotle’s own for denying that virtue is a techne¯. The whole of
the passage is as follows: “[M]oral knowledge, if the strained
phrase is to be used at all, is knowing how to behave in certain
sorts of situations in which the problems are neither merely
theoretical nor merely technical” (ibid.). He thus implies that
even if moral knowledge is a kind of know-how, it is not a merely
technical kind; it is not a mere skill like being proﬁcient at hitting
a bullseye when one tries.37 Unfortunately, if he has a more
ﬁlled-out view at this time, he does not attempt to explain it.
In the later “On Forgetting the Diﬀerence Between Right and
Wrong” (1958), Ryle has ﬁlled out his view on the matter to
some degree, but he no longer has any misgivings about virtue
being a kind of knowledge. His main topic, he says, is a puzzle
ﬁrst expressed by Aristotle—namely, Why can we not forget the
diﬀerence between right and wrong?—though it turns out that
his question is not quite Aristotle’s. Aristotle’s is a psychological
question, about why the virtuous person tends to remain virtu-
ous, whereas Ryle’s is a conceptual question, about why it does
37Indeed, earlier in The Concept of Mind, Ryle refers directly to Aristotle on
this point, though not directly in relation to knowing-how:
Aristotle realized that in talking about motives we are talking about dis-
positions of a certain sort, a sort diﬀerent from competences; he realized
too that any motive, unlike any competence, is a propensity of which it
makes sense to say that in a given man in a given walk of life this motive
is too strong, too weak, or neither too strong, nor too weak. He seems to
suggest that in appraising the moral, as distinct from the technical, merits
and demerits of actions we are commenting on the excessive, proper or
inadequate strength of the inclinations of which they are exercises.
(Ryle 1949, 112)
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not make sense to say that one has “forgotten” what one once
“morally knew”.
His answer involves the claim that whereas genuine moral
knowledge has care (or love, or enjoyment, or admiration) as a com-
ponent, theoretical and technical knowledge do not. He brings
out this point with an example concerning skills:
A person who has received technical instruction in tennis, music,
or landscape gardening may, but may not, owe to his instructor a
second debt of gratitude for having taught him also to enjoy these
things . . . Learning to enjoy, to love, or to admire is not acquiring a
skill or a parcel of information. Nonetheless it is learning.
(Ryle 1958, 385)
Similar to skill at tennis or music or landscape gardening, moral
knowledge must be acquired; but what is learned in acquir-
ing moral knowledge is not a mere skill or bit of information.
Just as the person merely proﬁcient at tennis might enjoy or
not enjoy tennis itself, so the person proﬁcient at behaving well
might enjoy or not enjoy behaving well. But unlike skill at ten-
nis, which one can possess without caring about doing well in
tennis, Ryle thinks that moral knowledge requires caring about
right and wrong and about behaving well.
Rather than claiming that moral knowledge is a “strained
phrase” as he had in The Concept of Mind, Ryle here claims that
philosophers have been too stingy with it and related concepts.
He says that the notions of learning, studying, teaching, and know-
ing are “ampler notions than our academic epistemologies have
acknowledged” (ibid., 385). And in response to the objection that
learning to admire or enjoy is a two-part process comprising
coming to know and coming to enjoy, he asks (and answers),
Why not add that sometimes coming to know is, also, inter alia,
coming to admire or enjoy? . . . The reply that what is learned must
be either a piece of information or a technique begs the question,
since the question is, in part, “Why must it be either one or the
other?” (Ryle 1958, 387)
Ryle thus thinks it quite natural to talk of genuine moral knowl-
edge, despite its requiring care. And he also takes the fact that
moral knowledge does require care to provide the answer to
his puzzle. The reason it makes no sense to speak of forget-
ting the diﬀerence between right and wrong, he says, is that
moral knowledge requires caring about doing right and not do-
ingwrong, and though one can cease to care, ceasing to care is not
the same as forgetting.38 This could explain why in The Concept
of Mind, Ryle was hesitant to assimilate virtue to theoretical or
technical knowledge; but, as in prior work, here he is perfectly
comfortable with the idea that it is a kind of knowledge.
Ryle’s ﬁnal paper on the topic is his “Can Virtue be Taught?”
(1972). I want to look at this paper in some detail. On reading its
ﬁnal pages, it can be easy to think that he has come, ﬁrmly and
ﬁnally, to the view that virtue is not a kind of knowledge. Indeed,
that is what he explicitly concludes. This conclusion, however,
sits uneasily with other remarks in the paper; and this internal
tension casts some doubt on the sturdiness of his ﬁnal position.
I will argue that we thus have two options for reading this ﬁnal
paper: one which resolves the tension by ascribing to Ryle a
simple mistake and one which sees this ﬁnal paper rather as a
microcosm of his career-long vacillation on the relation between
virtue and knowledge. I do not, however, try to decide between
these options.
As the title of the paper suggests, Ryle is once again con-
cerned with Socrates’s question of whether virtue can be taught.
More speciﬁcally, he is concerned with a particular version of
that question: namely, “Why are there no professional teachers of
38As McGrath (2015) has pointed out, Ryle’s reasoning here is somewhat
perplexing. Even if knowing the diﬀerence between right and wrong does
involve care, it is unclear why “ceasing to care is not forgetting” would entail
“forgetting the diﬀerence between right and wrong is conceptually impossi-
ble”. Why not rather say that because caring is merely a part of knowing
the diﬀerence between right and wrong, it is possible to forget the diﬀerence
between right and wrong?
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virtue?” He considers an answer inspired by Aristotle (viz., that
virtues, like skills, cannot be taught by lectures alone but only by
supervised practice), but he notes that this does not actually an-
swer Socrates’ question. For it does not explain why there are no
professional teachers of virtue, even though there are swimming
coaches and golf professionals and laboratory demonstrators.
He believes, that is, that Socrates is asking not only why there are
no professional teachers of virtue but, as it were, why the idea
of a “professional teacher of virtue” does not make sense.
In beginning to answer this question, he repeats much of the
content of his 1958 paper. He argues that acquiring virtue is
not just a matter of acquiring information and not just a matter
of acquiring technical knowledge, and he again claims that it is
rather, at least most basically, a matter of coming to care about
certain things:
We have now got Socrates’ central question “How, if at all, can
virtue be taught?” separated oﬀ from questions about acquiring
information and acquiring proﬁciencies; and the odd thing about
this central question now is that in one waywe all know the answer
to it perfectly well. We remember how our parents reprimanded
certain sorts of conduct in quite a diﬀerent tone of voice from that
in which they criticized or lamented our forgetfulness or our blun-
ders . . . In these and countless aﬃliatedwayswewere, in a familiar
sense of “taught”, taught to treat, and sincerely treat, certain sorts
of things as of overwhelming importance . . . (Ryle 1972, 441)
And in posing the same potential objection from the 1958 pa-
per, that coming to care is not learning anything, he again im-
plies that philosophers have been too stingy with their epistemic
concepts—this time by reference to the tripartitioning of the soul
which we have seen him criticize elsewhere. Here, though, he
is even more liberal with his epistemic concepts, implying that
caring sometimes amounts even to knowing:
One source [of resistance to the thought that coming to care is
learning something] is this. In our abstract theorizing about hu-
man naturewe are still in the archaic habit of treating ourselves and
all other human beings as animated department stores, in which
the intellect is one department, the will is another department and
the feelings a third department . . . So we take it for granted that as
the intellect is notoriously the one department into which lessons
go, our wills and feelings are not themselves teachable. They can-
not know anything; they cannot be more or less cultured or culti-
vated . . . This department store yarn is sheer fairy-story.
(Ryle 1972, 442)
In expressing a distaste for the view that the will and feelings are
not themselves teachable and cannot know anything, Ryle seems
to have given up on his earlier position that caring cannot amount
to knowing. And though he also expresses a distaste for the “de-
partment store” talk in which this point is expressed, the lesson
certainly seems to be that coming to care can amount to a kind
of learning and coming to know. If that is right, these passages
indicate a doubling down on his 1958 position that virtue is a kind
of knowledge. For he had held in 1958 that virtue is a kind of
knowledge despite thinking that care (one necessary component
of virtue) is not. If he now holds that care sometimes is a kind of
knowledge, that should only strengthen his commitment to the
view that virtue is as well.
As I have already mentioned, however, he in fact concludes
otherwise. He concludes that virtue is not a kind of knowledge.
Having said that virtue is not a matter of having become well-
informed (not a kind of informational knowledge) and not a
matter of having come to know how to do anything (not a kind
of technical knowledge), he says not that virtue is some other
kind of knowledge (as he had allowed in 1958) but, rather, that it
does not very comfortably wear the label of “knowledge” at all,
since it is to be honourable [for instance], and not only or primar-
ily to be knowledgeable about or eﬃcient at anything . . . Where
Socrates was at fault was, I think, that he assumed that if virtue
can be learned, then here, as elsewhere, the learning terminates
in knowing. But here the learning terminates in being so-and-so,
and only derivatively from this in knowing so-and-so—in an im-
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provement of one’s heart, and only derivatively from this in an
improvement in one’s head as well. (Ryle 1972, 444)
First, then, Ryle now implies that informational and technical
knowledge are the only kinds. For he argues that virtue is not a
matter of knowledge in part because it is neither of those. And,
second, he now seems to imply that caring cannot amount to
knowing. He contrasts “being so-and-so” with “knowing so-
and-so”, and the former is clearlymeant to be amatter, most basi-
cally, of caring. An improvement in one’s heart is now contrasted
with coming to know anything, whereas the earlier passages
seemed to aim precisely at discounting that tendency. There
would seem, then, to be a tension in Ryle’s thinking here. There
is a tension at least in what he has written.
Unfortunately, I donot think the tension canbe resolvedwithin
the paper itself. There are two prima facie routes for doing so,
but neither succeeds. First, one might interpret Ryle’s contrast
of “being so-and-so” with “knowing so-and-so” not as denying
that caring can be a kind of knowing (hence not as contradicting
the earlier passages) but, rather, as asserting that even though
caring sometimes is a kind of knowing, what is not a kind of
knowing is the state one reaches when one’s cares have led to
corresponding changes in one’s “other departments”. In other
words, one might interpret him as saying that even if each of the
components of virtue is a kind of knowledge, virtue itself is not.
Virtue, in that case, is more than the sum of its parts.
The problem with this interpretation is that after the above
passage Ryle goes on to explicitly state that caring is not a kind of
knowing, repeatinghis reason from1958. He says thatwhile “the
acquisition of skills and keennesses [i.e., cares] can both be called
‘learning’ . . . the losing of skills and keennesses cannot both be
called ‘forgetting’” (1972, 445). He thus implies that only what
can be forgotten can be known, such that caring is not a kind
of knowing. Rather than resolving the tension with the earlier
passages, then, this interpretation simply re-emphasizes it.
Alternatively, then, wemight look for interpretative help from
his answer to the main question of the essay (“Why are there no
professional teachers of virtue?”), since this answer itself turns
on what he takes for the nature of care. The ﬁrst part of his
answer is, again, that virtue requires learning to care about the
right things. The second part is that trying to teach someone to
care, with precisely that as one’s aim, is bound to fail. Speaking
speciﬁcally of moral teaching, he says the following:
[I]n matters of morality as distinct from techniques, good examples
had better not be set with an edifying purpose. For such a would-
be improving exhibition of, say, indignation would be an insincere
exhibition . . . The example authentically set would be edifyingly
shamming indignation. (Ryle 1972, 446; emphasis added)
Ryle’s point here is that in having as one’s aim to teach someone
to care about something, one can only be teaching them sham
care. And in that case, a professional teacher of virtue (because,
in part, an intentional teacher of care)will necessarily be a failure.
He thus holds that though cares can be learned, they cannot be
taught.
He does not say so, but it might be that he takes such “teach-
ability” to be another criterion for knowledge; he may hold that
if something can be learned but not taught, it is not knowledge.
That would be consistent with the claim in the latter part of the
paper that care is not a kind of knowledge, as well as explaining
the conclusion that virtue is not either. But in addition to being
a bad reason—e.g., I cannot be taught how ﬂowers smell, but
I can certainly know—the point again only serves to reiterate
the tension with the earlier passages, rather than to resolve it.
Whereas he implies in the earlier passages that care can amount
to knowledge, he denies this in the later passages.
This leaves us with two options in reading this ﬁnal paper.
The ﬁrst is to ascribe to Ryle a simple mistake: he intended to
imply in the earlier passages that the will and feelings can be-
come learned, cultured, or cultivated but not that they can know
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anything. We could here imagine that if the latter implication
had been brought to his attention, he would have disavowed it
and, perhaps, expressed himself diﬀerently, making clear from
the beginning that he does not think that caring ever amounts
to knowing. This reading would straightforwardly resolve the
paper’s internal tension. On the other hand, wemight think that
Ryle’s thinking at this time is simply unsettled, much as it was in
regard to the same topic in The Concept of Mind. The ﬁnal paper
would then be an exempliﬁcation of his career-long vacillation
on the topic of virtue and knowledge, rather than expressing a
ﬁnal and settled position. This latter reading, though it would
not resolve the paper’s tension, would be in keeping with a
philosopher who viewed philosophers as properly unsettled and
constantly taking up questions anew, as concerned with practice
and method rather than answers—as more like an “ebbing tide”
than the “sediment” it leaves behind (Ryle 1937, 320).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to introduce a new aspect of Ryle’s
thinking on knowledge-how—an ethical aspect, exemplifying
itself both in his concernwithwhether there is any sense to being
a philosopher and in his concern with whether virtue is a kind
of knowledge. With regard to the former, he seems to have been
fairly constant in thinking that knowledge-howsecures the status
of the philosopher and philosophy. The philosopher’s proper
concern is with method, rather than answers—so their proper
kind of knowledge is knowledge-how, rather than knowledge-
that. And with regard to the latter, while he begins by thinking
that virtue, too, is a kind of know-how, he later comes to hold
not only that it is not a kind of know-how but, further, (though
perhaps with some tension) that it is not any kind of knowledge
at all.
In concluding, it might be worth mentioning where current
philosophy stands in regard to Ryle’s two ethical worries, and
alsowhere it might go. The nature of philosophy and its method
is of course a regular topic of philosophical discourse, but it is not
for us theWorry that it was for Ryle and his generation. Current
existential threats to thepractice of philosophy tend to come from
outside it, rather than fromwithin—fromphenomena suchas the
corporatization of the university, rather than from the seeming
senselessness of philosophy itself. Ryle’s intellectual worry, on
the other hand, is alive and well. Alongside the further revival
of virtue ethics since his time, interest has also grown in the idea
that virtue might be well-understood as a form of skill—the idea
which he early proposed but later abandoned.39 This debate is
rich, but in my estimation it has yet to move much beyond Ryle’s
own arguments. In various forms, those proposing virtue as a
skill still run up against the very problem that Ryle identiﬁed:
that virtue seems to constitutively require something like care or
commitment, whereas possession of a practical skill does not.40
Wheremight this debate go? Proponents of the idea that virtue
is a skill have yet to consider a view which we have seen Ryle
tacitly deny, in denying that care is a kind of knowledge. They
have yet to consider that care and commitmentmight themselves
be forms of skill.41 Philosophy of mind in the wake of Ryle, how-
ever, has at least sometimes taken this idea more seriously. John
Haugeland (1998), for instance, argues that what he calls “exis-
tential commitment” is a distinctive kind of skill. Interestingly,
this is the very kind of commitment we have seen Ryle exem-
plify in his concern to secure the foundations of philosophy. It
is commitment not merely to a thing (such as philosophy) but
to its very possibility, or to its making sense. Admittedly, such a
39Leading this revival has been JuliaAnnas (e.g., 1995, 2011). See alsoRussell
(2015) and Stichter (e.g., 2016, 2018). For a critical perspective on some of this
work, see Small (ms).
40This point of Ryle’s is given slightly diﬀerent clothing in Dougherty (forth-
coming).
41Of those concerned with skill and virtue, Roberts (1984) perhaps comes
closest to doing so.
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conception of commitment as a formof skill has not been pressed
very ﬁrmly; but if it were to prove sound, not only might virtue
be vindicated as a form of skill, but at least in terms of his com-
mitment to philosophy, Ryle would prove to be a more virtuous
philosopher than many currently give him credit for.
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